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Abstract Beall and Murzi (J Philos 110(3):143–165, 2013) introduce an object-
linguistic predicate for naïve validity, governed by intuitive principles that are
inconsistent with the classical structural rules (over sufficiently expressive base theo-
ries). As a consequence, they suggest that revisionary approaches to semantic paradox
must be substructural. In response to Beall and Murzi, Field (Notre Dame J Form Log
58(1):1–19, 2017) has argued that naïve validity principles do not admit of a coherent
reading and that, for this reason, a non-classical solution to the semantic paradoxes
need not be substructural. The aim of this paper is to respond to Field’s objections and
to point to a coherent notion of validity which underwrites a coherent reading of Beall
and Murzi’s principles: grounded validity. The notion, first introduced by Nicolai and
Rossi (J Philos Log. doi:10.1007/s10992-017-9438-x, 2017), is a generalisation of
Kripke’s notion of grounded truth (J Philos 72:690–716, 1975), and yields an irreflex-
ive logic. While we do not advocate the adoption of a substructural logic (nor, more
generally, of a revisionary approach to semantic paradox), we take the notion of naïve
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validity to be a legitimate semantic notion that points to genuine expressive limitations
of fully structural revisionary approaches.
Keywords Curry’s paradox · Naïve validity · Substructural logics · Grounded validity
Consider the following naïve principles, governing a yet unspecified notion of validity:
Validity Proof (VP) If ψ follows from ϕ, then the argument 〈ϕ ∴ ψ〉 is valid.
Validity Detachment (VD) ψ follows from ϕ and from the validity of the argument
〈ϕ ∴ ψ〉.
Let π be a sentence equivalent to Val(π, ⊥), where  is a name-forming device,
⊥ is a constant for absurdity, and the predicate Val expresses the notion of validity char-
acterised by VP and VD.1 We may then reason thus. One first notices that ⊥ follows
from π and Val(π, ⊥), courtesy of VD. Since π is equivalent to Val(π, ⊥),
this amounts to saying that ⊥ follows from two occurrences of π . Structural contrac-
tion now allows one to conclude ⊥ from a single occurrence of π , whence by VP
Val(π, ⊥) follows from the empty set of premises. By definition of π , this is a
proof of π . But since ⊥ has been shown to follow from π , Cut yields a proof of ⊥.
This is the validity Curry paradox, or v-Curry for short.
We should stress at the outset that the notion of validity that gives rise to paradox is
not logical validity. Purely logical validity does not unrestrictedly satisfy VP (if Val
is to express logical validity, the rule must be restricted to purely logical subproofs)
and is certainly a consistent notion.2
While we do not advocate a non-classical approach to semantic notions,3 in order
to investigate the v-Curry paradox and its philosophical implications, we’ll assume for
the sake of argument that semantic paradoxes are to be solved via a revision of classical
logic. Beall and Murzi (2013) point out that, on this assumption, if Val satisfies both
VP and VD (or closely related principles), one of the classical structural rules must go.
More generally, Beall and Murzi argue that the v-Curry paradox is a genuine semantic
paradox and that, for this reason, if semantic paradoxes are to be solved via logical
revision, such a revision should be substructural.4 Hartry Field (2017) has objected
that ‘taken together, there is no reading of [VP and VD] that should have much appeal
to anyone who has absorbed the morals of both the ordinary Curry paradox and the
Second Incompleteness Theorem’ (Field 2017, p. 1). For this reason, he concludes
that the v-Curry paradox doesn’t call for a substructural revision of logic. Elia Zardini
(2013, pp. 634–637) argues along similar lines that VD is incompatible with Löb’s
Theorem and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
1 Sentences such as π can be shown to exist in a number of ways, both in formal and natural languages.
For present purposes, we simply assume their existence.
2 See Ketland (2012), Cook (2014) and Nicolai and Rossi (2017, §2).
3 See Murzi and Rossi (2017a, b).
4 For a recent discussion of the distinction between structural and substructural theories of naïve semantic
notions, see Shapiro (2017). For some arguments in favour of a non-contractive approach to naïve validity,
see Weber (2014).
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Our response to Field and Zardini is twofold. We first review their specific objec-
tions, and argue that they fall short of offering conclusive reasons to question the
coherence of Beall and Murzi’s naïve principles for validity. In our next step, we
introduce a semantic construction for naïve validity, recently developed in Nicolai and
Rossi (2017), which generalises Kripke (1975)’s fixed-point construction for truth.
Just like Kripke’s construction yields a theory of grounded truth, the construction for
validity yields a theory of grounded consequence or validity—one that validates ver-
sions of Beall and Murzi’s principles. In keeping with our rejection of non-classical
approaches to semantic notions, we do not endorse the notion of grounded validity.
However, we argue that this notion provides a coherent reading of the naïve validity
principles, that can be used to respond to Field’s and Zardini’s criticisms.
The discussion is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the v-Curry paradox
and suggests that it is a generalisation of the Knower paradox. Section 2 critically
reviews Field’s and Zardini’s specific objections to the coherence of naïve validity.
Section 3 introduces the notion of grounded validity and argues that it provides a
coherent reading of (versions of) Beall and Murzi’s principles. Section 4 concludes.
1 Introduction
This section briefly sets the scene. After some technical preliminaries (Sect. 1.1), we
introduce the Knower and Curry’s paradoxes (Sect. 1.2). We then present the v-Curry
paradox, and briefly introduce Beall and Murzi’s argument for VP and VD (Sect. 1.3)
and Field’s preliminary discussion thereof (Sect. 1.4).
1.1 Technical premilinaries
We consider a first-order language with identity, call it LV , whose logical vocabulary
includes ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃, ∀, and ∃. We will only need the propositional fragments of the
theories that we will consider, so we will ignore quantifiers from now on. In addition,
LV contains a propositional absurdity constant ⊥, a propositional truth constant 
,
and a binary predicate Val(x, y). Terms and formulae of LV are defined as usual.
Closed formulae are called ‘sentences’. We use lowercase latin letters (such as s and
t) to range over closed terms of LV , lowercase greek letters (such as ϕ and ψ) as
schematic variables for LV -sentences, and uppercase greek letters (such as  and )
to range over finite multisets of LV -sentences.5 We require that theories formulated
in LV satisfy the following requirements:
– There is a function   such that for every sentence ϕ, ϕ is a closed term.
Informally,   can be understood as a quote-name forming device, so that ϕ is
a name of ϕ.
– For every open formula ϕ(x) there is a term tϕ such that the term ϕ(tϕ/x) is tϕ ,
where ‘ϕ(tϕ/x)’ is the result of replacing every occurrence of x with tϕ in ϕ.
5 A multiset is a collection of objects that is just like a set, except that repetitions count. Thus, for instance,
{ϕ,ψ,ψ} and {ϕ,ψ} are identical sets but different multisets.
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Let L denote the Val-free fragment of LV . We now recall the rules of intuitionistic
propositional logic. We do not use the turnstile symbol  to denote logical conse-
quence, but rather as a sequent arrow to axiomatise theories that will include logical as
well as naïve validity-theoretical rules (plus implicit syntactic principles). For simplic-
ity, we have opted for a single-conclusion natural deduction calculus in sequent-style,
in which structural rules are explicitly formulated:6
SRef
ϕ  ϕ
  χ
SWeak
, ϕ  χ
, ϕ, ϕ  χ
SContr
, ϕ  χ
  ϕ , ϕ  ψ
Cut
,  ψ
  ϕ   ψ
∧-I
,  ϕ ∧ ψ
  ϕ ∧ ψ ∧-E1
  ϕ
  φ ∧ ψ ∧-E2
  ψ
  ϕ ∨-I1
  ϕ ∨ ψ
  ψ ∨-I2
  ϕ ∨ ψ
  ϕ ∨ ψ 0, ϕ  χ 1, ψ  χ ∨-E
,0,1  χ
, ϕ  ψ
⊃-I
  ϕ ⊃ ψ
  ϕ   ϕ ⊃ ψ
⊃-E
,  ψ
, ϕ  ⊥
¬-I
  ¬ϕ
  ϕ   ¬ϕ
¬-E
,  ⊥
  ⊥ ⊥-E
  ϕ
As usual, we distinguish between structural rules, in which no logical operator figures,
and operational rules, which involve the occurrence of one or more logical operators.
Val(x, y) is to be informally understood as ‘the argument from x to y is naïvely
valid’. In light of such an informal understanding, Val intuitively satisfies the following
necessitation and factivity principles:7
 ψ
NEC Val(
, ψ)
  Val(
, ψ)
FACT
  ψ
We are now in a position to present some well-known paradoxical arguments.
1.2 The Knower and Curry’s paradox
We begin with a version of the Knower paradox (originally due to Kaplan and Mon-
tague (1960) and Myhill (1960)) formulated with our binary predicate for naïve
6 For more details on this formalism, see e.g. Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000, p. 41 and ff).
7 Field formulates these principles by means of a unary validity predicate, and calls (the resulting versions of)
NEC and FACT, respectively, VALP and VALD (Field 2017, p. 7). We stick to the binary validity predicate
and employ the constant 
 for this reason. Moreover, we adapt Field’s principles to our framework.
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validity. Let σ be a sentence equivalent to ¬Val(
, σ). We may then reason
thus. We first prove Val(
, σ)  ⊥:8
SRefVal(
, σ)  Val(
, σ)
FACTVal(
, σ)  σ
Definition of σVal(
, σ)  ¬Val(
, σ) SRefVal(
, σ)  Val(
, σ) ¬-EVal(
, σ), Val(
, σ)  ⊥
SContrVal(
, σ)  ⊥
Call the above derivation D0. We then derive Val(
, σ) from D0:
D0
Val(
, σ)  ⊥
¬-I ¬Val(
, σ)
Definition of σ σ
NEC Val(
, σ)
Call this derivation D1. D0 and D1 can now be combined together to yield a proof of
absurdity, courtesy of Cut:
D1
 Val(
, σ)
D0
Val(
, σ)  ⊥
Cut ⊥
Given ⊥-E, the foregoing reasoning yields a proof of any sentence ϕ, thus making any
theory in which it can be reproduced trivial.
Triviality can also be directly established without making use of ⊥-E, via Curry’s
paradox (Curry 1942), which again we formulate by means of the naïve validity predi-
cate. Where κ is a sentence equivalent to Val(
, κ) ⊃ ψ , where ψ is an arbitrary
LV -sentence, one proves Val(
, κ)  ψ reasoning in much the same way as
before:
SRefVal(
, κ)  Val(
, κ)
FACTVal(
, κ)  κ
Definition of κVal(
, κ)  Val(
, κ) ⊃ ψ SRefVal(
, κ)  Val(
, κ) ⊃-EVal(
, κ), Val(
, κ)  ψ
SContrVal(
, κ)  ψ
Call the above derivation D0. One then derives Val(
, κ) from D0:
D0
Val(
, κ)  ψ
⊃-I Val(
, κ) ⊃ ψ
Definition of κ κ
NEC Val(
, κ)
Call this derivation D1. D0 and D1 can again be combined together to yield a proof
of ψ :
8 The following derivations make also tacit use of the rules for intersubstitutivity of equivalents (e.g., in
the passage labelled ‘Definition of σ ’). We will always assume intersubstitutivity of equivalents without
making it explicit amongst our rules for the sake of readability.
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D1
 Val(
, κ)
D0
Val(
, κ)  ψ
Cut ψ
It is easy to see that the above paradoxical derivations are but variants of, respec-
tively, the familiar Liar and Curry’s paradox, involving a naïve truth predicate. To see
this, one need only notice that FACT is a notational variant of Tr-E
  Tr(ϕ)
Tr-E
  ϕ
and that NEC is but a weaker version of
  ϕ
NEC+
  Val(
, ϕ)
which is in turn a notational variant of
  ϕ
Tr-I
  Tr(ϕ)
where Tr expresses truth.
1.3 The v-Curry paradox
While both the Knower and Curry’s paradoxes can be blocked by rejecting some of the
standard I- and E-rules for ¬ and ⊃, there are closely related paradoxical arguments
employing generalisations of NEC and FACT that cannot be so dismissed. Consider
again NEC:
 ψ
NEC Val(
, ψ)
On the naïve reading of Val, the rule tells us that if we have proved ψ , i.e. if we have
derived it from no assumptions, then it follows from 
 (which is always provable), i.e.
ψ follows from any sentence. A natural way to generalise NEC, then, is to apply the
validity predicate not only when a sentence has been proved, but also when a sentence
has been derived from a sentence, encoding this information into the naïve validity
predicate. In short, NEC can be liberalised to arbitrary inferences:
ϕ  ψ
VP Val(ϕ, ψ)
After all, one might reason, if one wishes to express (in the object-language) that a
sentence follows from the empty set of premisses, why shouldn’t one want to express
in the same fashion that a sentence follows from another sentence? Indeed, an even
more liberal way of expressing inferences via the naïve validity predicate would allow
arbitrary side sentences, as in the following rule:
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, ϕ  ψ
VP+
  Val(ϕ, ψ)
FACT also admits of a generalisation along similar lines:
  Val(
, ψ)
FACT
  ψ
If one can derive that ψ follows from 
 given , then one can conclude that ψ also
follows from . A straightforward generalisation can be motivated by asking what
can be concluded when ψ follows from an arbitrary sentence ϕ (given ), rather than
from 
. Suppose that ψ follows from ϕ given : since ψ is the conclusion of a chain
of inferences, it is natural to ask under which conditions one can conclude ψ . The
following (naïve) option presents itself: since ψ follows from ϕ, if one has strong
enough grounds to conclude ϕ, then one can combine those grounds with  and derive
ψ . In other words, the following rule is a generalisation of FACT:
  Val(ϕ, ψ)   ϕ
VDm
,  ψ
As above, there seem to be no reasons to think that the case   Val(ϕ, ψ) is
conceptually different from the case   Val(
, ψ).9
It is important to notice that VDm and
(VD) ϕ, Val(ϕ, ψ)  ψ
are not quite the same rule: in the terminology of Ripley (2012), VD is an inference,
namely an object of the form   ϕ, and VDm is a meta-inference, namely a rule that
allows one to derive an inference from one or more inferences. VD can be immediately
obtained from VDm in the presence of the structural rule of reflexivity:
RefVal(ϕ, ψ)  Val(ϕ, ψ) Refϕ  ϕ
VDm
ϕ, Val(ϕ, ψ)  ψ
Likewise, VDm can be derived from VD given Cut. The structural difference between
VDm and VD matters in a substructural setting. For instance, approaches restricting
Cut cannot accept VDm, since together with VP it makes Cut admissible. In Sect. 3,
we will present a reading for the validity predicate that makes gives a coherent reading
of VDm but not of VD.
With VP and VDm (or VD) in place, we can now introduce Beall and Murzi’s
v-Curry paradox. Where π is a sentence equivalent to Val(π, ⊥) (so that π says
of itself that it entails absurdity), let D be the following derivation of Val(π, ⊥):
9 For more on how VP and VDm are generalisations of, respectively, NEC and FACT see Murzi and
Shapiro (2015, §2.1).
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SRef
π  π
Definition of π
π  Val(π, ⊥) SRefπ  π
VDm
π, π  ⊥
SContr
π  ⊥
VP Val(π, ⊥)
Using D, we can then ‘prove’ ⊥:
D
 Val(π, ⊥)
D
 Val(π, ⊥)
Definition of π π
VDm ⊥
This is the v-Curry paradox (Beall and Murzi 2013). Given that VD is derivable from
Ref and VDm, a proof of the paradox could also be given using VD and Cut.
Since the argument makes no assumptions about the logic of negation and the
conditional, it resists fully structural revisionary treatments, i.e. treatments that retain
all of SRef, SContr, and Cut. In particular, paracomplete theories, which restrict the
Law of Excluded Middle
(LEM) ψ  ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
as well as ¬-I and ⊃-I,10 and standard paraconsistent theories, which restrict the
principle of explosion (or ex contraditione quodlibet)
(ECQ) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ  ψ,
as well as ¬-E and ⊃-E,11 cannot be nontrivially closed under VP and VDm. These
theories can validate naïve semantic principles such as NEC and FACT, but they
cannot be closed under their generalisations VP and VDm, on pain of triviality. Beall
and Murzi (2013) conclude from this observation that, if the semantic paradoxes are
to be solved via logical revision, then one of SRef, SContr, and Cut, must go. Field
disagrees.
1.4 Field on the V-Schema
In a nutshell, Field (2017) argues that there is no coherent reading of  and Val for
which both VP and VDm (or VD) hold.12 According to Field, validity is standardly
defined in one of three ways: as necessary truth-preservation, as preservation of truth-
in-a-model (for suitably chosen models), or as derivability-in-S (for a suitably chosen
10 See e.g. Kripke (1975), Field (2008), Halbach and Horsten (2006) and Horsten (2009).
11 See e.g. Asenjo (1966), Priest (1979, 2006) and Beall (2009).
12 To be precise, Field does not explicitly address VDm. However, since he never considers restrictions of
reflexivity, and VD is derivable from VDm given Ref, we will treat VD and VDm as equivalent until Sect. 2
included (the difference between VD and VDm will only come into play in Sect. 3). Accordingly, we will
interpret Field as rejecting both pairs VP and VDm, and VP and VD.
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formal system S). However, Field argues that none of these notions makes both of VP
and VDm coherent. We discuss Field’s argument in detail in Sect. 2 below. We first
focus on what he has to say about the V-Schema, a naïve validity principle that Beall
and Murzi take to justify VP and VD.
Field strongly argues against the coherence of the V-Schema
(V-Schema)  Val(ϕ, ψ) if and only if ϕ  ψ,
a principle that Beall and Murzi take to be as intuitive for Val as the T-Schema
(T-Schema) Tr(ϕ) ↔ ϕ
is for truth. Field rectifies the claim, advanced in Beall and Murzi (2013), that the V-
Schema is equivalent to (i.e. interderivable with) VP and VD, since the V-Schema
is weaker than VP and VD taken together. He interprets Beall and Murzi as suggesting
that Val is better understood as ‘simply a rendering of ‘’ into the object language
(thereby allowing it to freely embed)’ (Field 2017, p. 7). But while he concedes that
‘prima facie this is a very natural suggestion’ he argues that it doesn’t support a
coherent reading of the V-Schema:
Beall and Murzi’s likening of the (V-Schema) to the truth schema [. . .] seems
incorrect: even on the assumption that ‘’ represents a kind of validity and ‘Val’
the same kind of validity, their schema has a ‘double occurrence of validity’
(‘ Val’) on the left side and a ‘single occurrence’ (‘’) on the right, making
the argument from right to left [. . .] problematic. And without the assumption
that ‘’ represents a kind of validity and ‘Val’ the same kind of validity, there
seems even less reason to accept VP. (Field 2017, p. 7)
Field then mentions a possible strengthening of V-Schema—one that, given SRef,
actually delivers both VP and VD:
(V-Schema+)   Val(ϕ, ψ) if and only if , ϕ  ψ.
However, Field also dismisses the V-Schema+, on the grounds of cases such as the
following:
snow is white, grass is green  snow is white, (1)
snow is white  Val(‘grass is green’, ‘snow is white’). (2)
According to Field, (1) holds, but (2) doesn’t.
Field’s argument fails to convince, however. To be sure, both the V-Schema and
the V-Schema+ fail if Val is interpreted as expressing logical validity. However,
such a reading is already known to be unsuitable for VP (Ketland 2012; Cook 2014;
Nicolai and Rossi 2017, §2). Hence, a fortiori, it does not fit stronger principles such
as the V-Schema and the V-Schema+. In any event, absent a precise characterisation
of  and Val, it is unclear whether one should accept or reject (1) and (2), and the
V-Schema and the V-Schema+ more generally. Field contends that no coherent
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notion of validity simultaneously satisfies Beall and Murzi’s principles. We aim to
show otherwise.
2 The case against VP and VD
We now turn to Field’s positive case for claiming that there is a fundamental asymmetry
between truth-theoretical and naïve validity-theoretical principles. We first discuss two
classicality constraints for Val, which Field expresses sympathy for but doesn’t endorse
(Sect. 2.1). We then turn to Field’s argument from definability, that the standard ways
of defining validity are incompatible with at least one between VP and VD (Sect. 2.2).
2.1 Classicality constraints
Field (2017, pp. 8–9) considers two possible classicality constraints for Val:
Weak Classicality Constraint (WCC) If the Val-free fragment of LV is classi-
cal, then sentences containing Val (restricted to inferences in L) should also
be classical, in the sense of obeying classical laws like excluded middle and
explosion.
Strong Classicality Constraint (SCC) Even for non-classical [Val-free] lan-
guages L, Val (applied to L) should be a classical predicate, in the sense that
classical laws like excluded middle and explosion apply to sentences containing
it.
In Field’s view, both principles are incompatible with a naïve conception of validity.
As he writes, the weaker principle ‘would immediately rule out substructural solutions
to the validity paradoxes in otherwise classical languages’ Field (2017, p. 8). What is
more, Field maintains that WCC also rules out non-classical solutions to Knower-like
paradoxes generated using NEC and FACT. But why should validity be classically
constrained? Field mentions two possible arguments.
First, given that ‘the notion of validity should serve as a regulator of reasoning’,
Field argues that it ‘would seem as it would hamper that role if there were inferences
for which we had to reject that they were either valid or not valid (or accept that they
were both) [. . .]’ (Field 2017, p. 9). Second, Field mentions what he calls the hypocrisy
problem. He argues that if validity were non-classical, one would have to formulate
a theory of validity within a non-classical meta-theory. But because it is very hard to
give a non-classical meta-theory, one might as well endorse one of WCC and SCC,
thus avoiding the hypocrisy problem.
Some comments are in order. First, on the rejection of classical laws for naïve
validity, it is unclear why this should be more problematic than a departure from
classical logic in the case of truth. After all, truth would also appear to regulate
reasoning—for instance, it is widely held that assertion aims at truth (see e.g. Dummett
1959). Second, WCC and SCC are strictly speaking not incompatible with a naïve view
of validity. The reason is that, while WCC and SCC would force Val to satisfy both
the excluded middle
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χ  Val(ϕ, ψ) ∨ ¬Val(ϕ, ψ)
and explosion
Val(ϕ, ψ) ∧ ¬Val(ϕ, ψ)  χ,
some substructural approaches, such as (validity-theoretic versions of) the theories in
Zardini (2011) and Ripley (2012), validate versions of both principles, for the whole
language.
To be sure, WCC and SCC might be construed as requiring that sentences containing
Val behave fully classically, where this includes the satisfaction of the structural rules.
This is where WCC and SCC part ways, however. If one interprets WCC in this
more stringent way, the criterion is still satisfied by several substructural theories of
naïve validity, including the approach of Ripley (2012) and the theory developed in
Nicolai and Rossi (2017), which will be also described in Sect. 3. Just as in the case
of many non-classical theories of truth, in such theories the Val-free sentences (and
also some sentences featuring Val) satisfy all classical rules, operational and structural
alike. By contrast, SCC is incompatible with substructural approaches that validate
VP and VDm. However, in absence of a plausible independent reason to accept SCC
(in its stricter reading), this requirement simply begs the question against substructural
logicians who are such because of the v-Curry and related paradoxes.
2.2 Field’s argument from definability
Field merely expresses sympathy towards WCC and SCC: his main argument against
the coherence of naïve validity-theoretical principles is independent of either principle.
In a nutshell, the argument is that none of the three main accounts of validity (validity
as necessary truth-preservation, validity as preservation of truth-in-M, and validity as
provability-in-S) is naïve. Hence, pending an alternative reading of Val, there seems
to be no good reason to accept both of VP and VDm.
2.2.1 Validity as necessary truth-preservation
Suppose that validity is equated with necessary truth-preservation, in the following
sense:
(VTP) The argument  ∴ ϕ is valid if and only if necessarily, if all the ψ ∈  are
true, then ϕ is also true.
On this view, Field argues, one between VP and VD must fail. For ‘any paradoxes of
validity will simply be paradoxes of truth in the modal language. Standard resolutions
of the paradoxes of truth . . . [will] carry over’ (Field 2017, p. 10). Thus, Field con-
cludes, ‘Beall and Murzi’s idea that there are new paradoxes of validity . . . requires
rejecting this reduction of validity to truth and . . . modality’ (ibid.).
One first difficulty with the argument is that, on a natural reading of it, it seems
premised on a standard revisionary approach, i.e. one validating the structural rules
of SRef, SContr, and Cut. But such rules are incompatible with naïve validity. Pre-
sumably, then, Field intends the argument to establish that standard paracomplete and
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paraconsistent approaches can already cope with the v-Curry paradox, if VTP holds.
But there are difficulties with this suggestion, too. As Field (2008, pp. 42–43, pp.
284–286, and pp. 377–378) has long pointed out, VTP cannot be consistently asserted
in a fully structural setting, on pain of Curry-driven triviality.13 But then, VTP cannot
be used to show that fully structural revisionary theorists have a reason to invalidate
one between VP and VD: such theorists reject VTP.
Field’s argument may be recast as the contention that fully structural solutions that
invalidate ⊃-I can reject VP, and that fully structural solutions that invalidate ⊃-E
can reject VDm and VD. However, this observation by itself does not tell against
proponents of naïve validity. Substructural theorists who are such because of the v-
Curry paradox can retort that they can offer a more compelling package: they can not
only retain each of ⊃-I, ⊃-E, VP and either VDm or VD; they can also consistently
assert (suitable versions of) VTP (see Murzi and Shapiro 2015).
2.2.2 Validity as preservation of truth-in-M
Field considers various possible model-theoretic characterisations of validity. Where
L is a language mathematically rich enough to formulate Peano Arithmetic (PA) or
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), he observes that validity can be defined model-
theoretically. As he writes,
[f]ocusing on one-premise inferences, the general form [of these definitions] is
either (i) that the inference from ϕ to ψ is valid if and only if in all models M of
type , if ϕ has a designated value in M then so does ψ ; or (ii) that it is valid if
and only if in all models M of type , the value of ϕ is less or equal to that of
ψ . (Field 2017, p. 17; Field’s notation has been adapted to ours)
Field’s general point is that in each of these cases, validity cannot be paradoxical on
the grounds that ‘the notion of validity is to be literally defined in set theory’ (Field
2008, p. 298).
The argument fails to convince, however. If it were legitimate to assume that validity
is model-theoretically definable in order to show that there are no paradoxes of naïve
validity, then it would also be legitimate to assume that truth is model-theoretically
definable in order to show that there are no paradoxes of naïve truth. But this seems
unacceptable (Murzi 2014, pp. 77–8). As proponents of naïve theories of truth point
out, what holds for model-relative notions need not hold for the corresponding model-
independent notions (see e.g. Field 2007, p. 107). To be sure, Field might object
that there is no coherent model-independent notion of naïve validity. However, his
argument from model-theoretic definability does not establish this stronger conclusion.
2.2.3 Validity as provability-in-S
Let S be a consistent, recursively axiomatisable theory (formulated in LV , or in a
language that extends it) that is strong enough to simulate self-reference. For simplicity,
13 See also (Beall (2009), §2.4), Beall and Murzi (2013) and Murzi and Shapiro (2015).
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we could require that S interprets PA or ZF. Either way, the notion of derivability in S,
in symbols S , is also a recursively enumerable relation. Field (2017, p. 12) suggests
that S might be taken to be a ‘mathematical theory . . . identical to that we use in our
informal reasoning’ , whose consequence relation S plausibly models the notion of
validity associated with S, or at least one such notion. If the validity predicate Val(x, y)
is to express S in the object-language, then it is natural to interpret Val(x, y) as
derivability in S. To indicate this specific reading, and in this subsection only, we will
write ValS(x, y). But here lies the problem.
If S is closed under VDm or VD, one can now derive all instances of the following
schema:
ValS(
, ϕ) S ϕ. (3)
But since ValS now expresses derivability in S, one can use ValS to define a (standard)
provability predicate ProvS(x) that provably applies to the code of ϕ if there is a proof
of ϕ in S. That is, ValS(
, ϕ) becomes equivalent to ProvS(ϕ). However, (3)
entails in S every instance of the local reflection principle ProvS(ϕ) ⊃ ϕ, and
therefore by Löb’s Theorem (or Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem) that S is
trivial (see Boolos (1993), Ch. 3). On these grounds, Field and Zardini reject VDm
and VD. As Field puts it:
[g]iven that PA and ZF are presumably consistent, we must reject VD […]. That,
I assume, is a fact that we have come to terms with long ago. (Field 2017, p. 12)
Likewise, Zardini argues that
derivabilty in PA actually coincides with validity relative to PA. It then becomes
utterly unclear why, in view of these facts, one should still expect VD to be
correct for Val. (Zardini 2013, p. 636)
If validity is derivability in a recursively enumerable system, VDm and VD must fail.
There are some difficulties with the foregoing argument, however. Even conceding
Field’s and Zardini’s assumption that naïve validity can be equated with validity rel-
ative to S, it is not at all clear that the latter notion can be identified with derivability
in S. A well-known argument from the First Incompleteness Theorem, first given (as
far as we know) by John Myhill (1960, pp. 466–7), suggests that validity outstrips
derivability in any recursively axiomatisable theory that interprets a small amount of
arithmetic, and whose axioms and rules we can at least implicitly accept as correct.
To see this, notice that we can establish S’s (canonical) Gödel sentence ρ by
means of a valid argument which—the First Incompleteness Theorem tells us—
cannot itself be formalised in S. Add to S all instances of the local reflection principle
ProvS(ϕ) ⊃ ϕ for S. Call the resulting theory S′. It is then a routine exercise to
prove ρ in S′. But while S′ proves ρ, it is arguable that S′ only articulates commit-
ments that were already implicit in one’s acceptance of S. After all, it would be hard to
accept S without accepting that it is sound, i.e. that what it proves holds. And yet, this
is precisely what one’s acceptance of ProvS(ϕ) ⊃ ϕ amounts to. But then, validity
relative to S cannot in general be identified with derivability in S. As Myhill puts it:
[i]t is possible to prove [κ] by methods which we must admit to be correct if we
admit that the methods available in [S] are correct. (Myhill 1960, pp. 466–7)
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From this perspective, the notion of validity that arises from PA, ZF, or indeed any
sufficiently expressive, recursively axiomatisable theory S is not identifiable with the
corresponding notion of derivability. While the latter is classically expressible in the
target theory and fails to respect VDm and VD, the former requires methods and tools
that extend the target theory, such as local reflection principles.
The natural upshot of the foregoing picture is a hierarchy of ever stronger theories,
none of which validates VDm or VD. Suppose, following Myhill, that explicating the
notion of validity relative to S commits one to accepting S′. Since Myhill’s argument
does not only apply to S but applies equally well to S′, one is naturally led to accept
S′′, the theory that results from the addition of all the instances of the local reflection
principles for S′ to S′. By the same token, one is led to accept the similarly defined
theory S′′′, and then to accept S′′′′, and so forth. This progression can be extended
into the transfinite.14 There are several choices to be made when generating such a
transfinite sequence of theories. Such progressions vary depending on the starting
theory and on how the iterations are defined. What matters for present purposes is that
such progressions have two relevant possible outcomes:
(i) The progression reaches a halting point, namely a theory SH such that the pro-
gression technique that was adopted at the outset cannot be applied to SH to yield
a stronger theory that is (computationally) simple enough for Löb’s Theorem to
apply.15
(ii) The progression reaches a stage (which may or may not be its halting point) such
that the theories beyond that stage are too complex for Löb’s Theorem to apply.
In situations of type (i), it can be argued that the fact that SH is a halting point is
merely a technical matter, that should have no conceptual consequences. That is, one
might insist that, if one accepts SH, one should also accept that it is sound, or that its
proof procedures are correct. It must then be possible to prove its Gödel sentence and
extend the theory, even though such extension must follow a different pattern than the
progression that led from S to SH. Eventually, though, the iteration procedures that are
needed to express the soundness of higher and higher levels of iterations will deliver
theories that are too complex for Löb’s theorem to apply. Therefore, situations of type
(i) collapse into situations of type (ii).
However, not even highly complex iterations to which Löb’s Theorem doesn’t apply
offer positive reasons for accepting VDm or VD. The problem is that even in the case
of theories that are too complex to have a workable provability predicate, it is unclear
that anything like VDm or VD is fully justified. In the construal of validity we are
considering, namely validity relative to a theory S, there is no point, in any progression
of theories along the lines sketched above, at which a theory S is closed under the
local reflection principle for S. VP and VDm or VD are a sort of unattainable ‘limit’
14 The study of the progressions of theories resulting from the systematic addition of schematic principles
(such as consistency statements, reflection principles, and others) to a starting theory was pioneered by
Turing (1939). Their systematic investigation was started by Kreisel (1960, 1970) and Feferman (1962),
leading to the crucial notion of autonomous progression (see also Feferman 1964, 1968). For an accessible
presentation of progressions of theories by iterated addition of reflection principles, see Franzen (2004).
15 A well-understood example is provided by the theory of ramified analysis up to the the Feferman-Schütte
ordinal 0 (see Feferman 1964, pp. 20–21).
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of the notions of validity relative to a theory that the acceptance of Myhill’s argument
suggests—a limit that fuels the progression of theories but that remains always one
step beyond the reach of every theory so generated.
2.2.4 Hierarchical validity
We have argued that understanding validity relative to S via a progression of ever
stronger theories doesn’t validate Beall and Murzi’s naïve principles. This should
not be surprising: a similar situation arises in the context of progressions of truth-
theoretic principles, namely Tarskian hierarchies.16 Field (2017, §9) sketches possible
hierarchical versions of VP and VD. Nicolai and Rossi (2017, §2.4) provide a precise
regimentation of a hierarchy for validity, and study its relation with a progression
of local reflection principles. As it turns out, at each ordinal stage, the theories in the
hierarchy for validity are interpretable in the theories resulting from the progression of
local reflection principles. But while an iterative conception of validity does not yield
the non-stratified VP and VDm, it nevertheless points in a more promising direction,
as Field himself suggests. Here’s how he closes his paper:
The thought might be that just as Kripke (1975) showed how to transcend
the Tarski hierarchy in a non-classical setting (introducing a single unstrati-
fied non-classical truth predicate […]), we should do the same for validity in
a non-classical setting. Extending the analogy, the idea might be to argue in
a non-classical setting that by starting from a hierarchy of validity predicates
and allowing sentences to ‘seek their own level’, an unstratified predicate that
satisfied VP and VD would emerge at some fixed point. [. . . ] Obviously there’s
no way that anything like this could happen if the non-classical setting were
merely paracomplete or paraconsistent, with standard structural rules—[. . .] the
whole point of the v-Curry argument was that mere paracompleteness or para-
consistency don’t suffice to allow for VP and VD together. But perhaps if we
did a construction modeled after Kripke’s in a substructural setting, VP and VD
together would emerge? That would certainly be interesting if it could be done,
but Beall and Murzi don’t claim it can, and nothing in their paper gives any
reason to think that it can. (Field 2017, pp. 15–6)
But it can. Nicolai and Rossi (2017, §§3–4) develop a construction that is in effect
a naïve validity-theoretical generalisation of Kripke’s (1975) construction for truth.
Their construction, called ‘KV-construction’ (for ‘Kripke’ and ‘validity’), delivers
non-trivial models of LV (or languages extending it) where VP and VDm (together
with the V-Schema+) hold unrestrictedly. The significance of this result is not only
technical: the construction can also be used to meet Field’s challenge of finding a
coherent reading of the naïve validity-theoretical principles.17
16 For a study of Tarski hierarchies for truth, their relation with recursive progressions of theories, and their
models, see Halbach (1996, 1997); for an axiomatic presentation, see Halbach (2014, Ch. 9.1).
17 Toby Meadows (2014) also offers a Kripke-style construction for naïve validity. A proper assessment
of Meadows’ construction would lead us too far afield. Here we limit ourselves to observe that (i) the
construction is extremely weak from the structural standpoint, since it forces restrictions of each of the
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3 A Kripkean construction for naïve validity
We begin by offering a (largely informal) presentation of the KV-construction in
Sect. 3.1.18 We then argue in Sect. 3.2 that one of the models that results from the KV-
construction suggests a coherent interpretation of naïve validity: grounded validity.
3.1 The KV-construction
The KV-construction generalises Kripke’s treatment of truth (strong Kleene version)
to naïve validity. Rather than constructing successions of sets of sentences (leading to
a fixed point), it builds successions of sets of inferences or sequents. We work with
the language of arithmetic, enriched with a primitive binary predicate Val(x, y), for
validity; we call this language LaV . More precisely, the KV-construction generalises
inferences to multiple-conclusion LaV -sequents, i.e. objects of the form   , where
both  and  are finite sets of LaV -sentences. From now on, we will work with finite
sets rather than multisets. We will continue using capital Greek letters (such as  and
) to denote finite sets.
The starting point of the KV-construction is analogous to Kripke’s: we take the
extension of Val to be momentarily empty, and ‘fill’ it gradually. When some infer-
ences are accepted, they can be declared ‘naïvely valid’ with the introduction of Val.
In Kripke’s construction, arithmetical truths and falsities are used to start off the inter-
pretation of the truth predicate. An analogous starting point is available for sequents.
The standard model N also provides arithmetical inferences (i.e. not involving the
validity predicate):
the sequents   ϕ, where ϕ is an atomic arithmetical sentence and N | ϕ,
the sequents ,ψ   where ψ is an atomic arithmetical sentence and N | ψ
That is, we start from inferences leading to an arithmetical truth, or starting from an
arithmetical falsity, with arbitrary side sentences.
We now need to explain how the acceptance of a collection of sequents can lead
to the acceptance of other sequents. Since we are dealing with sequents, and not
with sentences, this cannot happen (as in Kripke’s case) via some evaluation scheme.
However, we can resort to meta-inferences, namely principles that determine which
sequents are to be accepted given the acceptance of one or more other sequents. In
the KV-construction, we can consistently use inductive clauses modelled after all
the classical meta-inferences. Of course, we need to devise clauses for the validity
predicate too, namely clauses that tell us when a sentence of the form Val(ϕ, ψ)
can be introduced in a sequent, given some previously accepted sequents. An inspection
Footnote 17 continued
classical structural rules (reflexivity, contraction, and cut) and that (ii) it is not clear whether it addresses
Field’s challenge. For a strengthening of Meadows’ theory, see Pailos and Tajer (2017).
18 Our discussion here presupposes familiarity with Kripke’s theory. For a technically detailed presentation
of Kripke’s theory (strong Kleene version), see McGee (1991, Chapters 3 and 4); for a less technical
presentation, see Soames (1999, Chapters 4 and 5).
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of the naïve principles for validity suggests an obvious option: these principles are
classical implication principles formulated using a predicate, namely Val, rather than
a connective. It is then natural to use meta-inferences for Val modelled after the
classical meta-inferences adopted to introduce conditionals in sequents.
Several formalisms can be used to capture meta-inferences; we select a variant of a
classical sequent calculus. We now introduce the clauses that determine the acceptance
of new sequents.19 As in Kripke’s construction, we express them via an operator (on
sequents rather than sentences), which we call .  takes a set of sequents S and adds
to it the sequents with arithmetical atomic truths in the consequent, or arithmetical
atomic falsities in the antecedent, and the sequents resulting by applying the remaining
clauses to the sequents in S. For S a set of sequents,    is in (S) if:
   is in S, or
   is   0, s = t and N | s = t , or
   is 0, s = t   and N | s = t , or
   is   ϕ ∧ ψ,0 and   ϕ,0 is in S and   ψ,0 is in S, or
   is 0, ϕ ∧ ψ   and 0, ϕ, ψ   is in S, or
   is   ϕ ∨ ψ,0 and   ϕ,ψ,0 is in S, or
   is 0, ϕ ∨ ψ   and 0, ϕ   is in S and 0, ψ   is in S, or
   is   ∀xϕ(x),0 and for every closed LaV -term s:   ϕ(s),0 is in S, or
   is 0,∀xϕ(x)   and for some closed LaV -term s: 0, ϕ(s)   is in S, or
   is   Val(ϕ, ψ),0 and , ϕ  ψ,0 is in S, or
   is 0, Val(ϕ, ψ)   and 0  ϕ, is in S and 0, ψ   is in S
Taking ∅ for S, we generate a set (∅) that contains all the sequents with atomic
arithmetical truths in their consequent, or with atomic arithmetical falsities in their
antecedent, and nothing else. Further iterations of  lead to growing sets of inferences,
that match Kripke’s sequence of pairs of sets. We index the stages of this progression
with ordinals, writing Sα for the α-th iteration of  applied to S. In general, the
sequence is defined as follows, for every set of sequents S, and δ a limit ordinal:
Sα+1 := (Sα) Sδ :=
⋃
α<δ
Sα
The KV-construction also has fixed points. That is, there is an ordinal ζ such that, for
every set of sequents S:
Sζ+1 = (Sζ) = Sζ
19 The clause for introducing ∀ on the right is an ω-rule. This choice was made to make the KV-construction
into a genuine generalisation of Kripke’s construction. Moreover, in order to simplify the construction, we
don’t include a clause for negation. A negation connective obeying the classical meta-inferences is definable
from Val, putting ¬ϕ as Val(ϕ, ⊥).
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We indicate with S the fixed point of  generated by S, and with I the fixed point of
 generated by ∅. I is the least fixed point of the KV-construction, as it is included
in every other such fixed point.
I validates versions of VP, VDm, the V-Schema, and the V-Schema+. For ϕ,ψ
sentences of LaV , and , finite sets of LaV -sentences, the following holds:
(VP) if ϕ  ψ is in I , then ∅  Val(ϕ, ψ) is in I.
(VDm) if   Val(ϕ, ψ) is in I and   ϕ is in I , then ,  ψ is in I.
(V-Schema) ϕ  ψ is in I if and only if ∅  Val(ϕ, ψ) is in I.
(V-Schema+) , ϕ  ψ, is in I if and only if   Val(ϕ, ψ), is in I.
Thus, I validates all of Beall and Murzi’s naïve principles for validity, with the only
exception of VD (more on this in Sect. 3.2.2). In addition, all the classical struc-
tural rules bar reflexivity are recovered in I : this fixed point is closed under clauses
expressing left and right contraction, left and right weakening, and cut. All the results
we mentioned about I can be extended to fixed points including I , but this would
require some non-trivial extra work (see Nicolai and Rossi 2017, §4.2). A fixed point
S can thus be used to define a model of the full language LaV , where all of VP, VDm,
the V-Schema, and the V-Schema+ hold. The extension of the validity predicate
determined by S is given by the sequents of the form ϕ  ψ in S .
We conclude this section by noticing that the computational complexity of I is
identical to the computational complexity of the least Kripke fixed point for truth—a
relatively low complexity in the context of semantic theories of truth. We also observe
that, just as in the case of Kripke’s theory, the clauses of the definition of  can be
turned into a recursively enumerable theory that axiomatizes adequately, in the sense
of Fischer et al. (2015), the set of the fixed points extending I . Naïve validity need
not be too complicated to reason with.
3.2 Grounded validity
I provides a coherent reading of the notion of validity—one that makes sense of
many of the naïve principles discussed in Beall and Murzi (2013). Following Kripke’s
construction, we call this reading grounded validity, i.e. validity as grounded in truths
and falsities of the base language.20 The idea of grounded validity is simple: a sequent
   is to be accepted if and only if it results from iterated applications of the
clauses of  to sequents having atomic arithmetical truths in their consequent, or
atomic arithmetical falsities in their antecedent. This option is naturally associated
with I , since it follows the idea of grounded truth, associated to the least Kripkean
fixed point for truth. In what follows, we argue that the notion of grounded validity, as
articulated by I , addresses Field’s challenge of finding a coherent reading for Beall
and Murzi’s principles for naïve validity. We should stress, however, that we are not
20 See Kripke (1975), p. 694 and p. 701. For an analysis of Kripkean groundedness, see Yablo (1982). For
more on Kripkean grounded truth, see Leitgeb (2005), Martin (2011) and Burgess (2014).
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endorsing naïve validity. Our claim is simply that it can be made sense of, via grounded
validity, especially if one can already make sense of the Kripkean notion of grounded
truth.
3.2.1 The naïve principles for validity
We now review the case for VP, VDm, V-Schema, and V-Schema+, construing
naïve validity as grounded validity. In doing so, we also address some of Field’s more
specific objections.
VP states that it is possible to internalise the meta-theoretical notion of naïve validity
represented by , and express it via Val. In the reading offered by I , VP says that if
ψ follows from ϕ on the basis of arithmetical truths and falsities via the -clauses,
then it follows on the basis of arithmetical truths and falsities via the -clauses that ψ
follows from ϕ on the basis of arithmetical truths and falsities via the -clauses. This
much is obvious, since the -clauses themselves include a version of VP, that lets
one express via Val at level α + 1 the -inferences accepted at level α. This arguably
answers Field’s worry that there might be no reasons to accept a ‘double occurrence’
of the notion of naïve validity on the right of VP. Field also asks why couldn’t there
be true validity claims that are not valid. While I does not exclude this possibility,
it nevertheless shows that there is a uniform construal of  and Val under which this
is admissible. True grounded-validity claims are themselves groundedly valid, since
grounded validity just consists in the iterative generation of all the validities that derive
from our acceptance of arithmetical truths and falsities.
The justification of the V-Schema follows similar lines. We have already seen
how I makes it coherent to accept its direction corresponding to VP. As for the other
direction, it follows immediately from the fixed-point property of I , i.e. from the fact
that the -clauses are to be read as an ‘if and only if’ once we reach a fixed point.
We can thus reverse the claim that closes the previous paragraph: groundedly valid
validity claims are also just true grounded-validity claims. The extra iteration of the
notion of grounded validity on the right-hand side of the V-Schema does not add
anything substantial to the meta-theoretical grounded validity claim on its left-hand
side: the V-Schema just guarantees that the two expressions (meta-theoretical and
object-linguistic) of the same notion (grounded validity) are equivalent.
As for the V-Schema+, we have seen that Field rejects it with the following
example:
snow is white  Val(‘grass is green’, ‘snow is white’).
This inference is invalid if  and Val express logical validity. However, if naïve validity
is grounded validity, such an inference, and the V-Schema+ more generally, seem
perfectly acceptable. To see this, suppose we start our construction for I not from
truths and falsities of arithmetic, but from truths and falsities about the colour of snow
and grass. Then, it is a truth of the selected domain that snow is white, whence we
should accept ‘ snow is white’. Since this truth can be premised on any sentence,
one also gets:
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snow is white, grass is green  snow is white
This is clearly acceptable, if  stands for ‘what follows from what, starting from truths
and falsities about snow and grass, via the -clauses’. But then,
snow is white  Val(‘grass is green’, ‘snow is white’)
is no longer implausible: it just follows from the previous claim, internalising the 
via the predicate Val, which expresses the same notion of validity. The other direction
of V-Schema+ follows from the fixed point property, as explained in the previous
paragraph.
Finally, the acceptance of VDm in I follows from the fact that I is closed under
clauses which essentially express all the classical meta-inferences. In the case of I , it
is hard to see why some classical meta-inference should fail. Groundedly valid infer-
ences, expressed meta-theoretically or via Val, are determined by perfectly classical
claims (about arithmetical truths and falsities), so we see no plausible reason why
one should not accept all the inferences that follow from applying classical patterns
of reasoning to them. I delivers all the sequents that follow from closing the initial
arithmetical sequents under all the classical meta-inferences.
3.2.2 What’s rejected: reflexivity and the full VD
A grounded conception of validity makes it coherent to restrict Ref and the full VD.
Ref and VD have ungrounded instances, namely instances that cannot be obtained
from inferences having arithmetical atomic truths in their consequents, or arithmetical
atomic falsities in their antecedents. In LaV , or super-languages of it, such inferences
crucially feature sentences which themselves encode ungrounded inferences, via the
naïve validity predicate. Inferences formed with the v-Curry sentence π are a typ-
ical example, and indeed a grounded conception of validity rejects the instance of
reflexivity that involves π , i.e. π  π .
On a grounded conception of validity, such a conclusion need not appear so far-
fetched. Recalling the equivalence between π and Val(π, ⊥), the inferenceπ  π
can be informally glossed as follows:
From the fact that the inference from this very sentence to ⊥ is naïvely valid, it
follows that the inference from this very sentence to ⊥ is naïvely valid.
But if Val-sentences are grounded in meta-theoretical inferences, Val-sentences ulti-
mately derive from inferences featuring arithmetical truths or falsities. That is, in
order to understand the ‘. . . is valid’ used in π  π from the perspective of grounded
validity, one must unpack validity claims, iteratively unravelling the sentences in the
scope of Val to ultimately determine the base-language inferences from which π  π
derives. However, in the present case such an unravelling does not lead to inferences
that do not feature the validity predicate—it leads to a circular regress. We should also
stress that, much like in Kripke’s construction, cases such as π  π are the only kind
of instances of Ref that are not in I . The case of VD is entirely parallel.
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3.2.3 Grounded validity and Löb’s theorem
The notion of naïve validity encoded by I would appear to avoid Field’s and Zardini’s
objection from Löb’s Theorem: that VD and VDm are in conflict with Löb’s Theorem
and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. Call this the LG-objection. Running it
against I does not make much sense, since the LG-objection targets some recursively
enumerable theory. However, as was mentioned at the end of Sect. 3.1, an axiomatic
theory can be associated with the KV-construction, and shown to contain only sequents
grounded in arithmetical axioms, thus fleshing out a weaker form of grounded validity.
Even though not every instance of Val(
, ϕ)  ϕ is in the so-defined axiomatic
theory or in I , the following one is:
Val(
, 0 = 1)  0 = 1. (4)
This can be thought to create a tension with Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem
if Val is interpreted as a notion of provability. However, grounded validity does not
lend itself to such a reading. For one thing, it does not satisfy all of the Hilbert–Bernays
conditions, which are constitutive of (standard) provability predicates.21 For another,
given the defining conditions of Val in the KV-construction, Val is better understood
as an implication predicate, since it has the same clauses as the classical material
conditional. But the classical material conditional exceeds provability in many ways.
For instance, while modus ponens
  ϕ ⊃ ψ   ϕ
⊃-E
,  ψ
is arguably constitutive of ⊃, the corresponding meta-inference is unacceptable for
provability-in-S.
The notion of grounded validity provides a possible way of expressing the material
conditional as an implication predicate in the object-language. Because of the v-Curry
and related paradoxes, some principles that hold for the classical material conditional
must be abandoned—in the case of grounded validity, reflexivity. At the same time,
however, grounded validity is characterised by some principles that are constitutive
of the material conditional but not of provability, such as VDm, which is a version of
modus ponens. For this reason, grounded validity and provability overlap, but are not
even extensionally identical.
Even if grounded validity could be interpreted as a notion of provability, the LG-
objection would not have much force, since it would validate a parallel objection
against non-classical theories that validate the naïve truth rules or the T-Schema. If
VDm and (4) are to be dismissed on the grounds that they are in tension with Löb’s
Theorem, it might be retorted that the naïve truth rules or the T-Schema also violate
classical limitative results. After all, it is hard to see how (4) could be in tension with
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness theorem while claiming that
21 See Boolos (1993). In particular, it cannot satisfy the Val-theoretic version of the second 4-like Hilbert–
Bernays condition, namely  Val(Val(
, ϕ), Val(
, Val(
, ϕ))).
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Tr(λ) ↔ λ, (5)
(where λ designates a Liar sentence) is not in tension with Tarski’s Theorem.
In the case of non-classical, naïve theories of truth, a standard reply is that such
theories employ a non-classical logic, and hence do not violate classical limitative
results. But the same holds for grounded validity: it might be argued that just like the
conditional of (5) has to be non-classical, so too must the sequent arrow () in (4).
Therefore, either the LG-objection fails to apply to irreflexive, grounded validity, or
structurally similar objections apply to naïve truth, thus allowing one to conclude that
we should ‘have come to terms with’ the rejection of naïve truth ‘long ago’.
4 Concluding remarks
Field (2017) claims that if a construction modelled after Kripke’s cannot be done that
delivers Beall and Murzi’s principles,
we have a further respect in which the situation with the validity principles VP
and VD seems totally different from the situation with the principles of naive
truth. (Field 2017, p. 16)
We hope to have shown that such a construction can be done and that, pace Field,
the cases of truth and naïve validity are not ‘totally different’. The naïve notion of
grounded validity appears to indicate that truth and naïve validity not only give rise
to similar paradoxes, but can also be understood in similar ways. Then, the resulting
paradoxes can be dealt with in a similar fashion. As in the case of the paradoxes of truth,
a revisionary resolution of the paradoxes of naïve validity calls for an appropriate non-
classical logic, and for a coherent reading for the naïve semantic principles involved.
We hope to have provided both.
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